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Democracy, Free Association and Boundary Delimitation – The Cases 
of Catalonia and Tabarnia 
This article aims to illustrate the confusion within today’s secessionist movements 
regarding the liberal and the nationalist arguments for legitimizing secession. To 
do so, the liberal theory of secession – understood as an approach primarily based 
on consent – is examined, its limitations highlighted, and its contradictions with 
nationalism stated. We then use the case of the fictional Tabarnia region to show 
how problematic the use of liberal arguments by secessionist nationalism is. 
Although until now only a virtual region, Tabarnia exemplifies how nationalist 
arguments reappear in the defence of Catalan independence when its supporters 
claim to advance only (liberal) arguments of free association. 




For most of human history, humankind has lived within an inherited social and political 
framework over which it has generally been unable to consciously exercise control. The 
Enlightenment, liberalism and democratic progress may thus be understood as attempts 
to empower humans with the means to effectively influence the social and political world 
in which they live. Owing to these ideas, institutions, laws, codes, political practices and 
traditions have been subject to ever-growing scrutiny. 
The role of nationalism in this process is ambivalent. According to Elie Kedourie 
(1960: 9), nationalism is a doctrine that ‘holds that humanity is naturally divided into 
nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and 
that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government’. Here, the 
assumption that the world is ‘naturally divided into nations’ is contrary to the belief that 
mankind itself designs its social habitat, and the very idea of a natural division of peoples 
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has led to the most well-known catastrophes. However, the nationalist credo states that it 
is the people who take control over the power arrangement of the ancien régime – often 
perceived as ‘foreign’ – or, alternatively, that they cast off the yoke of an empire or 
colonial power. In these cases, nationalism certainly empowers or aims to intensify 
political participation for a people that, partially or completely, has previously been 
excluded from it. 
In today’s separatist discourse, regarding 1) nationalism as a historic catalyst for 
the establishment of popular sovereignty and 2) nationalism as a maximalist ideology that 
seeks the rearrangement of borders based on pre-political assumptions, we find that these 
two concepts are mixed and confused when they should be analytically separated. 
Therefore, when today’s separatist movements challenge established liberal democracies, 
they tend to identify the nationalist reorganisation of frontiers (1) with an intensification 
of democratic government. (2) This ‘natural’ association between the nationalist and the 
democratic element was originally proposed by John Stuart Mill (1977 [1861]: 547) in 
his famous work Considerations on Representative Government: ‘Free institutions are 
next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people 
without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united 
public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist’. 
Therefore, within a sociologically aware liberalism that seeks optimum conditions for the 
founding and survival of representative government rather than establishing abstract 
principles of individual rights, national integration clearly benefits democracy (Miller 
2003: 262-74). 
However, it is not only the argument of cultural homogeneity that is advanced by 
those who seek secession today, for example, in the case of Catalonia. One reason is that 
to do so would be to employ the very same argument that has traditionally accompanied 
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the nation-building processes of large European states, a development that separatists 
today all but aim to reverse. According to Will Kymlicka (2011: 255-6), a matching 
between a political border and a national culture can be achieved in two ways: either by 
rearranging established borders so that they overlap pre-existing cultural spheres of 
influence by means including secession and annexations (thereby taking for granted that 
a clear-cut separation in identities is possible) or by engaging in a process of cultural 
homogenisation within a territory that is already politically formed. Defending that the 
former way of pursuing a political territory’s cultural harmonisation is legitimate, while 
the latter is not, is the central issue in the separatist discourse.  
Hence, separatism today tries to identify itself not so much with the defence of an 
assumed harmonic relation between culture and polity but with the belief that consensus 
is imperative for the legitimacy of any given border regime. This consensual 
rearrangement of the modern nation state’s frontiers would thus mean nothing less than 
the conquest of one of the last strongholds that has prevented mankind from consciously 
shaping its environment. The alliance between democracy and nationalism is forged by a 
plebiscitary mechanism inherent to referenda: The ‘right to decide’ empowers a group of 
people to determine whether they continue to form part of a state – or not. As symbols of 
the archaic arbitrariness in which human history evolved, borders would now be subject 
to democratic accountability. However, in addition to this argument, the traditional 
nationalist axiom of re-establishing natural harmony is still to be found in the separatist 
discourse. The vast majority of separatists still defend that pre-political links carry an 
‘extra’ legitimacy over the arbitrary and artificial political relations that were 
subsequently established. 
We suggest analytically distinguishing between two lines of argumentation that 
are frequently confused: (1) a consensual argument based on the right to decide, i.e., the 
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celebration of a referendum, and (2) a purely nationalist argument favouring national 
independence. Our position holds that the first is also a nationalist argument, in that it 
does not defend the right to decide for any given strata of a people that hold a common 
will but, rather, grants the right to decide to a territory that coincidentally matches a set 
of cultural characteristics that are recognised as such by the very same group of people in 
the first place. 
The first part of this article examines the liberal justification of secession, taking 
Harry Beran’s theory as its clearest formulation. We intentionally ignore remedial right 
theories, which focus on justice or human rights matters, topics that Allen Buchanan 
(1991, 2003) explored in his work, because our aim is to analyse and clarify the role of 
pure liberal theories of secession, which are based only on consent. We then study the 
case of the fictional region of Tabarnia, where the democratic argument in the secessionist 
discourse is pushed to its limits in a way that forces the underlying nationalist figure to 
emerge. Our approach ultimately aims to clarify the relationship between the concepts of 
sovereignty, nation, and free association in today’s discussion of territorial secession. 
 
Secessionism and Free Association 
 
 
In our understanding, Harry Beran is the champion of the liberal theory of secession. In 
his distinction between a ‘nationalist’ and a ‘democratic’ reason behind political self-
determination (which ultimately allows for secession), the elements of a liberal theory of 
secession, free from any nationalist contamination, are laid out (Beran 1998: 33). 
The two most important theories of morally rightful political boundaries 
are the nationalist and the democratic theory of political self-
determination. According to the former, it is nations that have the right 
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of political self-determination. According to the latter, political unity 
must be voluntary, and it is democratically self-defined territorial groups 
that have this right. 
In the ‘democratic’ theory, it is not nations that exercise self-determination but ‘self-
defined territorial groups’. This difference is important. While in the nationalist theory 
the world’s division into nations is a pre-political fact, Beran’s theory links ‘territorial 
groups’ to their members’ free expression in the form of a ‘self-definition’. Not 
surprisingly, Beran finds that any attempt at territorial ordinance based on nationalist 
assumptions is doomed to fail (Beran 1994: 47-65). However, he also holds that the 
democratic principle should guide the delimitation of political units – which would make 
secession legitimate in a wide range of cases – an idea that Beran attributes to authors 
such as Gilbert Murray, Robert Dahl, Thomas Pogge and David Gauthier (Beran, 1998: 
34). 
The starting point of Beran’s theory is the postulate that adults bear ‘the right of 
personal self-determination and, therefore, of freedom of association with willing 
partners’ (Beran 1998: 39). Here, a first difficulty emerges: Given the impossibility of 
totally breaking the linkage between state and territory, it is not the individuals who 
associate themselves with the latter (not even in Beran’s theory) but, rather, some kind of 
territorially bound human cluster, howbeit ever so small. Individuals cannot choose their 
affiliation with any political unit individually, at least if one does not consider the 
possibility of potential universal migration in a borderless world – which, in any case, 
would then grant an advantage to those whose preferred unit coincides with the territory 
in which they already live. 
Facing the problem that voluntary political association is practically impossible 
to pursue on an individual level, Beran and other representatives of liberal secession 
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theory are forced to establish something that we coin a ‘minimum sovereignty unit’. This 
unit is defined as minimum because it aims to approach as closely as possible the 
individual right to self-determination. Thus, in Beran’s (1998: 40) words, ‘the right of a 
smaller community always overrides the right of the larger community of which it is part, 
if there is a conflict of wishes regarding political boundaries’. Now, the philosophical 
problem of how to determine the very last community to which this principle applies is 
obvious. 
The argumentative shift should not be overlooked: The right to self-
determination is founded in the individual but exercised on a superior level. Therefore, 
the leap from the individual to the point where self-determination comes into existence 
might be smaller than in the case of nations, but it still exists.1 Beran (1984: 21-31) had 
first stated, ‘liberalism requires that any territorially concentrated group within a state 
should be permitted to secede if it wants to and if it is morally and practically possible’. 
Therefore, territorially concentrated groups – regardless of their concrete composition – 
constitute sovereign elements. In a later publication, Beran called these minimum 
sovereignty units ‘territorial communities’. ‘Territorial communities’ or ‘territorially 
concentrated groups’ constitute the first link that individuals establish between 
themselves and serve as a basis for the superposition of other composite structures. In 
conclusion, ‘individuals have the right of free association, including the right to form 
territorial communities on land they rightfully hold or acquire’ (Beran 1998: 37). 
 
1 It is only in the radical libertarian theory close to anarchism where the transfer is not made. Here, 
the problem of individual self-determination becomes a mere technical issue, and the right to 
secession has its last and only foundation in the individual. Cf. McGee (1992, 45-66).  
8 
 
We identify three main problems linked to these postulates of liberal secession: 
a) the link between individual preference and territorial settlement, b) the delimitation of 
territories where the majority principle can be applied, and c) the underlying concept of 
political organisation. 
Minimum Sovereignty Units and Free Association 
 
Liberal theories open to secession – such as Beran’s – often imply that the strength of the 
voluntary link is inversely related to the size of the group in question. Beran speaks of 
‘the right to form territorial communities’, stating that political links should resemble the 
liberty of choice that characterises marriage or labour relations in liberal democracies. 
‘Because of liberalism’s commitment to freedom as an ultimate value, liberals see the 
ideal society as one that comes “as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme”’ 
(Beran 198: 24). 
At this point, we think that a couple of questions should be raised: Do individuals 
really exercise their liberty to establish themselves in a given territory according to their 
associative preferences? Does a society better meet the ideal of voluntary association if 
the dominant political link between its members is based on low-order vicinity instead of, 
say, nationality? These beliefs do not seem to respond to the way in which humans, until 
today, have settled in any given territory: Association is often the result of previous 
vicinity, while vicinity is normally not the consequence of associative preferences. Now, 
from Beran’s liberal perspective, one could argue that this statement describes only the 
ideal situation, that in which free association is a key element of every kind of political 
and social linkage. Importantly, however, even in that case, every change of vicinity 
would then mean a relevant change of association, which in turn would break the great 
agility and ease of settling that characterises modern states, inhibiting instead of 
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facilitating individual movement. This inhibition is one of the paradoxically illiberal 
consequences of the maximalist approach to consent in liberal theory. 
In summary, for Beran’s theory to be appropriate, association should be the first 
motivation for settlement. In that case, political institutions would gain in consensus, 
while individual territorial movements would be more significant – but become more 
strenuous. 




For liberal secessionism, climbing down the ladder of the diverse levels of majority rule 
still the preferred way of ultimately determining the voluntarist nature of political 
relations. Thus, the smaller the size of sovereign units is, the better the correspondence 
between boundaries and individual preferences. These territorial units operate as entities 
that can associate between themselves; however, while decision-making still resides on 
this (last) level, individual preferences ultimately draw the political map. 
In other words, with the majority principle operating amongst minimum sovereign 
units, a better matching between individual preferences and state affiliation would be 
possible. Therefore, when democracy heads towards the liberal principle of free 
association, it should reduce the size of decision-making units where majority rule is 
applied. ‘The reiterated use of the majority principle to settle disputes about political 
borders [...] maximizes the number of individuals who live in mutually desired political 
association, an ideal implicit in the right of freedom of association’ (Beran 1998: 39). 
However, any limitation on the scope of a given sovereign unit does not eliminate 
the underlying pre-democratic character of its original demarcation. Regardless of 
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transferring it to a lower level, the problem of delimitation remains intact. Who, then, 
defines the precise limits of territorial communities? 
The reiterated use of the majority principle to settle disputes about 
political borders always yields a determinate result. It therefore 
provides an adequate response to Ivor Jennings’ quip (1956: 56) that 
‘the people cannot decide [issues of political boundaries] until someone 
decides who are the people’ (Beran 1998: 39). 
From our perspective, Ivor Jennings has a point. The majority principle offers a clear-cut 
result at all times, even though its area of application must be previously defined. 
Therefore, there is no conceivable way in which the majority principle can evade an 
important pre-democratic supposition: the exact delimitation of the matter of who. Any 
vote requires a previous idea about the concrete boundaries of the sovereign unit (howbeit 
ever so small) that the ballot addresses. This delimitation may be constructed around a 
forecast or an educated guess about the will to associate of a given people, not by strictly 
applying the majority principle. 
Some authors distinguish between a liberal and a democratic theory of secession 
(de Lora 2018). We believe that this distinction is confusing precisely because of the 
different possible ways in which to determine who the people is. The question of the 
application of the majority rule in the case of the delimitation of territory may be answered 
in two ways that justify secession: 1) the nationalist option (‘the nation itself constitutes 
the legitimate delimitation’) or 2) the liberal option (‘any minimum sovereignty unit 
constitutes a possibly legitimate delimitation’). Therefore, for Beran’s ‘democratic’, we 




The Right to Secession and the Nature of Political Organisation 
 
At this point, it is important to stress that a pure realisation of the theory in question would 
not lead to the secession of a somehow identified peripheral nation but to a wider political 
fragmentation. The ultimate perspective is one of territorial discontinuity that calls into 
question elementary state functions. Beran proposes an intellectual experiment in the case 
of the former state of Yugoslavia concerning the application of the majority principle in 
territorial communities: 
Some of the borders of the republics of the former Yugoslavia would 
have been substantially redrawn. Many Serbian communities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia would, no doubt, have joined Serbia. Some 
Croatian communities in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina would 
probably have joined Croatia (Beran 1998: 51). 
Therefore, ‘some states may end up with two sorts of enclave: small independent 
microstates, and pockets of territory that belong to another state’ (Beran 1998: 51). In 
cases in which a minimum sovereignty unit does not coincide with state boundaries, 
resulting in the fragmentation of the state into a multitude of sovereign units, one can 
indeed expect a territorial realignment in favour of microstates and territorial 
particularism. 
In Beran’s view, his theory ‘is intended to be compatible both with versions of 
democratic liberalism and of democratic socialism’ (Beran, 1998: 34). However, it would 
be more accurate to speak of a genuinely new political model whose consequences appear 
to be compatible only with libertarianism. Issues such as the provision of infrastructure 
for vast territories, the question of property rights regarding natural resources, and the 
logic of patronage resulting from the potential mobility of high political associations 
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would lead to a very different polity model compared to that which modern states 
established in terms of citizenship and the public sphere. 
At this point, it may be useful to recall Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between 
civil associations and enterprise associations. While the latter are characterised by a 
teleological motive, the former are defined by an ‘absence of such a purpose or choice’ 
(Oakeshott, 1975: 158), which allows a legal system to set the conditions for individuals 
to strive and pursue their own interests. Autonomy within an enterprise association is 
intrinsically linked to consent and its removal (‘freedom here is conceptually tied to the 
choice to be and to remain associated’, Oakeshott, 1975: 158); in contrast, civil liberty 
concerns making individual decisions within a given political framework. 
In liberal secession theories such as Beran’s, affiliation with a state is an important 
part of individual freedom of choice. Secessionists would argue that this aspect is not 
related to the pursuit of a common goal, as in the case of Oakeshott’s enterprise 
associations; rather, it is related to granting the possibility of choosing the framework 
within which individual liberty is exercised. However, in a scenario where small 
sovereign units dominate the political landscape, the reality would be a politicisation of 
these ‘last links’ and, therefore, a granting of a deeper meaning to relationships that 
previously did not bear it. 
The construction of large state structures and their corresponding societies 
opened a space for individuals to flourish. In contrast, interpreting the concept of society 
in terms of matrimonial cohabitation or labour relations would make that space, 
paradoxically, less free. In our view, a reductionist understanding of liberalism that does 
not consider the different contingencies on which freedom is ultimately based leads to 





Catalan Nationalism and the Creation of Tabarnia 
 
In pursing an objective, political arguments tend to adapt to the moral context of their 
time to seek the support of public opinion. In this way, the discourse of Catalan separatist 
nationalism has clearly changed the ethnos’ right to self-determination for the demos’ 
right to freedom of association (Lehning 1998: 8-10). 
Secession is now justified in the media not by the right of complete political 
autonomy for an ethnic community but by the notion that state affiliation should 
ultimately rest in citizens’ consent. The ideal way to measure consent is, of course, the 
celebration of a referendum on self-determination. Since the failed attempt to hold such 
a referendum on 1 October 2017 – blocked by Spanish police – claims that link 
democracy and ‘sovereignism’ are ubiquitous throughout the Catalan political landscape. 
Their aim is to depict a face-off between freedom and authoritarianism. In this fight, the 
nationalist movement does not defend secession outright but a ‘right to decide’, thus 
rallying the support of not only those in favour of independence but also those in favour 
of holding a vote on the matter (that is, ‘non-separatist sovereignists’). In very few cases, 
however, is the liberal idea according to which the smaller the sovereign unit, the more 
democratic the configuration of boundaries – or any other justification of why Catalonia 
should be the sovereign delimitation subject to popular consultation – mentioned. 
Thus, regarding the Catalan case, we see a mingling of liberal secession theories 
and nationalist arguments in politics and the media and even within the scientific 
community. One outcome is that liberal concepts are being exploited for nationalist 
purposes. Ironically, those in Catalonia who favour secession and adopt arguments from 
the liberal theory of secession to make their point support and discriminate against the 
public use of the Spanish language even though Catalan society today is practically 
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bilingual. The regional government’s policy is to impose the Catalan language in the 
educational system against the will of a considerable number of both parents and students. 
Local shops already face fines if they label their services in Spanish and not in Catalonian. 
Therefore, both the secessionists’ policy proposals and their implementation are not very 
liberal but, rather, are nationalist: They represent not the free association of fellow-
language speakers but the integration of all citizens in a new political community defined 
in cultural terms. In particular, this situation poses challenges to the liberal theory of 
secession when comparing the Catalan linguistic example with the cases of Belgium and 
Quebec. In the latter, we see separate communities with corresponding diverging 
competences in their respective second language; however, in the former, the vast 
majority are able to properly speak and read in both official languages. 
The case of Catalonia thus shows that local secessionists are not generally moved 
by considerations of free association but by the vision of a national community whose 
cultural links are considered more legitimate than those of political competitors. In other 
words, it is not about free association aimed at constructing a society based on consent 
but an alleged national community that seeks to restore (i.e., its legitimacy lies in the 
past) a previously usurped reality. Some who claim that their goals are backed by the 
liberal theory of secession do indeed pursue policies that contradict its spirit. 
We believe that the liberal ideal is met on the occasion of Catalonia forming part 
of the Spanish state that functions in the manner of an Oakeshottian civil association as a 
device to guarantee Catalans their freedom to associate according to their linguistic 
preferences, rather than in the form of a new Catalan state that, with its acquired political 
powers, backs the transformation of a bilingual community into a monolingual 
community. In our opinion, this phenomenon is a paradoxical effect that the liberal theory 
of secession entails: The politisation of the link between individuals and the political unit 
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to which they belong makes it more difficult for diverging ideas, languages, or cultures 
to remain within the same political framework – with the result that states become less 
pluralistic political units. The free and conscious decision of belonging to a given political 
unit would then resemble the choice of a political ideology, resulting in a backlash against 
the integrative vocation of modern pluralist states. 
All these motives underlie the emergence of the fictional region Tabarnia, a 
creation of non-secessionist Catalan citizens. Its virtual territory includes the urban parts 
of the Catalan coast, where only a minority of citizens support secessionism (Barcelona, 
its periphery, and Tarragona), although activism is mainly carried out on social media. In 
a bid to counter the attack of Catalan nationalism, the new territory’s followers use their 
rivals’ arguments to justify the project: 1) Tabarnia’s supporters want a democratic right 
to decide their own independence from Catalonia; 2) they claim that Tabarnia is 
discriminated against in financial terms vis-à-vis the Catalan hinterland; 3) and, finally, 
they allege that while the secessionists’ Catalonia is rural, conservative and closed-
minded, they represent the cosmopolitan, advanced and open-minded part of the region. 
Some of Tabarnia’s supporters trace its founding moment back to the medieval 
county of Barcelona, which we believe is an unnecessary historic argument that obscures 
the fundamental point: If secessionists defend their project of an independent Catalonia 
on liberal and not nationalist grounds, then they are impelled to grant a right to secession 
to territorial communities such as Tabarnia. In fact, Catalan secessionism affirms the right 
to sovereignty of the historic region Valle de Arán (a small territory in the Pyrenees with 
certain unique cultural patterns). However, the underlying motive in this case may lie 
instead in an anticipatory move to immunise their own movement against accusations of 
incoherence by granting the right to secession to a historic community that represents 
only a small piece of Catalan territory.  
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Therefore, the real test for the liberal argument in the case of Catalonia would be 
the granting of ‘the right to decide’ for territorial communities not because of their 
coincidence with any historic terrain but because of their rejection of the creation of a 
new Catalan state – especially if it were Barcelona, Catalonia’s economic, symbolic and 
urban centre. Were this the case, we would see Brenan’s prediction regarding his theory 
of secession become reality: a landscape of state pluralism and territorially discontinued 
states. 
Let the separatist movement specify the area in which a plebiscite is to 
be held, e.g. North Wysteria. Assume there is a majority for secession 
and that secession is granted in principle. Now any area of North 
Wysteria must in turn be permitted to vote on whether it wishes to secede 
from North Wysteria (and stay with what is left Wysteria, if they wish) 
(Beran, 1984, 29). 
The general public’s uncertainty regarding whether the Tabarnia phenomenon constitutes 
satire or is indeed a serious political proposal illustrates that we are still far away from 
thinking about political units in the way in which the liberal theory of association 
suggests. This does not mean, however, that the virtual territory ‘[...] is clearly a 
provocation, and not even a very intelligent one at that. It trivialises the notion of identity, 
treating it as if it is something as pedestrian as changing clothes’ (Tsavkko García 2018), 
an opinion that some international media seem to share. On the contrary, Tabarnia is a 
welcome test case for checking the liberal promises of Catalan secessionism, ultimately 
revealing its basic nationalism. 
In addition, it inspires us to think about another remarkable point: In a territory as 
polarised as Catalonia is today, identities tend to be shaped by politics rather than by 
culture. Consequently, the logic of association that most respects its members’ identity 
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would separate between nationalists and non-nationalists. The ridiculing criticism of 
Tabarnia’s symbolic nation-building (it already has a flag, a seal, etc.) on the grounds that 
it lacks a retrospective narrative is a criticism of nationalist motives that contradict the 
liberal mindset.2 
Thus, after it had been possible to imagine national communities in modern times 
owing to a ‘half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and 
productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality 
of human linguistic diversity’ (Anderson 2006: 46), perhaps it is now the time for 
internet-based interaction to facilitate the advent of different types of communities based 
on different types of human affinities. Tabarnia may be just one of its first adumbrations. 
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